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THE TORT OF AIDING AND ADVISING?: 
THE ATTORNEY EXCEPTION TO AIDING AND 
ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
KEVIN BENNARDO* 
 
Attorneys face a variety of ethical challenges.  While doing the “right” 
thing may not always be easy, it should always be clear.  Rules of profes-
sional conduct demarcate the line between right and wrong in some 
instances.  Other areas, however, are left to common law (and judicial 
interpretation) to develop.  This article deals with one such area: whether 
(and, if so, under what circumstances) an attorney may be held liable for 
aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
Part I of this article explores the traditional aiding and abetting 
standard in tort law.  Part II applies that standard to breach of fiduciary duty 
liability.  Next, Part III surveys case law of tort actions for aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty by attorney-defendants, and Part IV 
questions whether attorneys should have an affirmative duty to prevent 
clients from breaching fiduciary duties.  Finally, Part V applies public 
policy to reach the conclusion that attorneys should not be given any 
exception from liability when sued for aiding and abetting a client’s breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
I. AIDING AND ABETTING STANDARD 
The common law of torts imposes liability for aiding and abetting 
another in commission of a wrongful act.1  The parameters of aiding and 
abetting liability are laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts using a 
three-prong test: (1) the aided party must commit tortious conduct; (2) the 
aider must know that the aided party’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty; 
and (3) the aider must give substantial assistance or encouragement to the 
aided party.2 
 
 *Law Clerk to the Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois; J.D., 2007, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.  The author 
extends gratitude to Arthur Greenbaum for aiding and abetting in the preparation of this essay. 
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 89, 89 (Mass. 1861) (“Any person who is 
present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or exciting the same by words, gestures, 
looks or signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances and approves the same, is in law 
deemed to be an aider and abettor, and liable as principal.”). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).  “For harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the 
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According to comment (d) to that section: “Advice or encouragement 
to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is 
known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser 
as participation or physical assistance.”3  However, assistance can be so 
slight so as to avoid liability; the factors to consider in determining liability 
are: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount of assistance given 
by the defendant; (3) the presence or absence of the defendant at the time of 
the tort; (4) the defendant’s relation to the other; and (5) the defendant’s 
state of mind.4 
II. APPLICATION OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY 
STANDARD TO BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
A fiduciary relationship is one in which “one person [called a ‘fiduci-
ary’] is under a duty to act for the benefit of another [called a ‘beneficiary’] 
on matters within the scope of the relationship.”5  Common examples of 
fiduciary relationships include guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attor-
ney-client.6  The fiduciary’s obligation to act for the benefit of another is 
known as a “fiduciary duty,” and breach of that duty causes the fiduciary to 
be liable to the beneficiary.7 
Combining aiding and abetting liability with this breach of fiduciary 
duty liability creates a straightforward result: one who knowingly provides 
substantial assistance or encouragement to another in breaching a fiduciary 
duty is liable for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.8  As 
explored above, providing advice or encouragement satisfies the substantial 
assistance prong.9  Therefore, it follows that an attorney who counsels his 
or her client to breach a fiduciary duty should be liable for aiding and 
abetting that breach of fiduciary duty. 
Aiding in a breach of fiduciary duty may also be aiding in the commis-
sion of a crime.  For example, an attorney may advise a trustee on how to 
siphon funds from a beneficiary.  Other times, however, a breach of fiduci-
ary duty is not criminal, but is tortious.  For instance, a tortious breach of 
 
other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to 
the other so to conduct himself.”  Id. 
3. Id. § 876 cmt. d. 
4. Id. 
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (2d pocket ed. 2001). 
6. Id. 
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979). 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., Bird v. Lynn, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 422 (Ky. 1850), *2 (stating that liability for 
encouraging tortious activity should be imposed when the encouragement has a direct relation to 
the tortious conduct and was intended to produce it). 
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fiduciary duty occurs when an agent forgoes their principal’s interest and 
instead pursues their own self-interest, or when a partner takes on a client 
on the side rather than giving the benefit to the partnership.10  If an attorney 
advised that agent or that partner as to how to breach their fiduciary duty 
with greater stealth or success, that attorney would have aided and abetted 
in a breach of fiduciary duty.  This begs the question of whether the attor-
ney, who owes a fiduciary duty to his or her own clients, should be liable to 
their client’s beneficiary. 
III. RECENT CASE LAW 
Two approaches are developing regarding the emerging area of aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in tort law: (1) creating an explicit 
exception that safeguards attorneys from liability, and (2) employing less 
straight-forward means to reach the same end. 
A. AN EXPLICIT EXCEPTION FOR ATTORNEYS 
The most prominent decision recognizing an explicit exception for 
attorneys is that of the Oregon Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Schrock.11  
Reynolds and Shrock purchased two parcels of land together.12  Shrock 
sued Reynolds, and the lawsuit was settled.13  Shrock’s lawyer, Markley, 
took part in the negotiations and drafting of the settlement agreement.14  
Under the settlement agreement, Reynolds was to transfer his shares in one 
of the two properties to Shrock and the parties would sell the other property 
together, with Reynolds receiving the proceeds.15  If the sale of the second 
property did not amount to $500,000, Schrock would pay Reynolds the 
difference and Reynolds would be given a security interest in the first 
property to ensure payment.16 
As agreed, Reynolds transferred his interest in the first property to 
Shrock.17  Markley advised Schrock that nothing stopped her from selling 
the first property before the sale of the second property, thereby making it 
impossible for Reynolds to claim a security interest in it.18  Schrock, with 
 
10. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Bigelow, 100 N.W. 723, 724-26 (N.D. 1904) (finding 
impermissible self-dealing on the part of a real estate agent who surreptitiously sold his principal’s 
land to himself for less than an outside buyer was willing to pay). 
11. 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006). 





17. Id. at 1064. 
18. Id. 
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Markley’s aid, secretly sold the first property before the sale of the second 
property.19  Under advisement by Markley, Schrock then revoked her 
consent to the sale of the second property because of an alleged breach of 
the settlement agreement by Reynolds.20  Since the first property had 
already been sold to an innocent third party, Reynolds was unable to take a 
security interest in it, and was also unable to sell the jointly owned second 
property.21 
Reynolds sued Schrock for breach of fiduciary duty and Markley for 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.22  The lawsuit against 
Schrock was settled, leaving Markley as the sole defendant.23  The court 
held that summary judgment in the attorney’s favor was proper, recognizing 
an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and abetting a client’s 
breach of fiduciary duty.24  However, the exception created for attorneys is 
not unlimited: For a third party to hold an attorney liable for aiding and 
abetting a client in breach of a fiduciary duty, the burden is on the third 
party to prove that the lawyer acted outside the scope of the lawyer-client 
relationship.25  This exception extends liability to attorney conduct that is 
unrelated to the representation of a client (even if the person is a client), in 
the attorney’s own self-interest, or within the “crime or fraud” exception to 
the attorney-client privilege.26 
The court cited the Restatement for support: “One who otherwise 
would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within 
the limits of a privilege.”27  The court determined that such a “privilege 
from liability” was proper in the attorney-client setting because the 
attorney-client relationship is “integral to the legal system itself.”28  Since 
clients need lawyers in many situations, the court felt that providing 
lawyers protection from certain aiding and abetting liability would help 
ensure that attorneys focused on pursuing their clients’ interests rather than 
their own self-interests in avoiding liability.29 
This decision distinguished itself from, and seemingly greatly nar-







24. Id. at 1069–72. 
25. Id. at 1069. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979)). 
28. Id. at 1068. 
29. Id. at 1068–69. 
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liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in Granewich v. 
Harding.30  In distinguishing the cases, the Oregon Supreme Court noted 
that the attorneys in Granewich acted outside the scope of the attorney-
client relationship.31  While the court in Granewich did accept as true the 
allegations in the complaint pleading that the attorneys acted outside the 
scope of their legitimate employment, the court did not state that this fact 
was determinative to its decision, declaring instead that the defendants’ 
“status as lawyers is irrelevant.”32 
Reynolds was not the first decision to recognize an attorney exception; 
a Texas appellate court had done so previously in Alpert v. Crain, Caton & 
James, P.C.33  Since the complaint in that case did not allege that the 
defendant-lawyers committed any “independent tortious act or misrepresen-
tation” outside of the representation of the client, the court barred the non-
client plaintiff from bringing an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty 
cause of action against the attorneys.34  No published Texas decision has 
imposed liability on a lawyer for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty.35 
While not an “aiding and abetting” case by name, the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii approved of the Reynolds decision in Kahala Royal Corp. v. 
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, LLP.36  The court in Kahala cited 
Reynolds by analogy to support the proposition that attorneys’ actions 
within the scope of the lawyer-client relationship fell within the litigation 
privilege when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-lawyers were liable 
for “tortious inducement of breach of fiduciary duty.”37  The “litigation 
privilege,” a less expansive privilege than the full attorney-client privilege 
recognized in Reynolds, protects an attorney from liability to his or her 
client’s civil litigation adversary if the act of the attorney occurred in the 
course of the attorney’s representation and is related to the civil action.38 
 
30. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). 
31. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1065. 
32. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 795. 
33. 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005). 
34. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 407. 
35. See Jessica Palvino, Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Is Privity Making a Comeback?, 70 
TEX. B.J. 52, 53 (2007) (noting that although Texas law recognizes a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, Texas courts “have shown reluctance to extend this cause 
of action to attorneys whose only actions were to represent their clients”). 
36. 151 P.3d 732 (Haw. 2007). 
37. Kahala, 151 P.3d at 751–52, 752 n.19.  “[T]ortious inducement of breach of fiduciary 
duty” is a plaintiff-created and undefined cause of action that, based on its designation, appears to 
be similar—if not identical—to aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. 
38. Id. at 750. 
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B. A LESS-THAN-EXPLICIT EXCEPTION FOR ATTORNEYS? 
Case law on attorney liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduci-
ary duty is limited, but varied (as to whether the tort exists, its components, 
and its application to attorneys).39  Unlike the Reynolds decision discussed 
above, other decisions have declined to explicitly carve out an exception for 
attorneys. 
Courts seem to disfavor extending liability to attorneys acting to further 
their clients’ interests.40  While considering a case involving accountants, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota balanced public policy to narrow the 
liability of professionals (including attorneys) in aiding and abetting breach 
of fiduciary duty cases without explicitly adopting another prong of 
inquiry.41  Focusing on the plaintiff’s pleadings, the court determined that 
the claim had not been pled with enough particularity—alleging neither 
“actual knowledge” nor “substantial assistance” by the defendants.42  De-
spite imposing this heightened pleading standard for the first time, the court 
did not remand the case to permit the plaintiff to amend her complaint, but 
rather held that the plaintiff had failed to state a colorable claim, and 
awarded summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.43 
A recent decision on the topic, Alexander v. Anstine,44 unfortunately 
sheds no new light on the issue.  Because it determined that the attorney’s 
client had not breached a fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
“save[d] for another day the question of whether an attorney can ever be 
liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty to a non-client.”45  
The Colorado Court of Appeals, both in the lower decision in that case and 
 
39. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.6 (5th ed. 
2000) (reviewing cases on attorneys’ liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty). 
40. See Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(finding that even though an Illinois court has never found an attorney liable for aiding and 
abetting his client in a commission of a tort, a per se bar preventing such tort actions is not 
appropriate); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Mass. 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to show 
that defendant-attorney not only knew of the breach of fiduciary duty, but actively participated to 
such an extent that no reasonable claim of good faith could be made); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. 
Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774-75 (S.D. 2002) (noting that an attorney who merely acts as a 
“scrivener” for a client has not given “substantial assistance” to the client’s breach of fiduciary 
duty and therefore cannot be held liable). 
41. Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 (Minn. 1999) “[I]n cases 
where aiding and abetting liability is alleged against professionals, [the court] will narrowly and 
strictly interpret the elements of the claim and require the plaintiff to plead with particularity facts 
establishing each of [the] elements.” Id. 
42. Id. at 187-89. 
43. Id. at 189 n.4. 
44. 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. 2007). 
45. Alexander, 152 P.3d at 503. 
       
2008] THE TORT OF AIDING AND ADVISING 91 
in another case, had previously recognized that an aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit could lie against an attorney.46 
IV. FIRST, DO NO HARM; SECOND, PREVENT HARM? 
A. AND NOW, A WORD FROM THE COMMENTATORS 
Academic discussion has arisen regarding whether attorneys have an 
affirmative duty to prevent their clients from causing harm in the form of a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  The argument over whether an attorney must, 
must not, or may disclose to a client’s beneficiary that the client is acting 
inappropriately with regard to the fiduciary relationship presupposes the 
basic notion that the attorney should not contribute to the client’s 
malfeasance. 
Professor Hazard advocates that where an attorney’s client is a 
fiduciary of a third party, that third party assumes “derivative client” status 
and the actual client is the “primary client.”47  Under this model, the 
attorney effectively has two clients: the primary client (the actual client who 
hired the attorney) and the derivative client (the beneficiary of the primary 
client’s fiduciary duty).48  Since the primary client (as a fiduciary) is obli-
gated to work in the interest of the derivative client (as a beneficiary), the 
attorney is as well.49  Three consequences of this primary-derivative client 
model follow: (1) the lawyer’s obligation to avoid participation in his or her 
client’s fraud is engaged by a more sensitive trigger than usual;50 (2) the 
lawyer must ensure that the fiduciary-primary client volunteers complete 
and truthful information to the third party-derivative client;51 and (3) the 
lawyer has a duty to disobey instructions that would wrongfully harm the 
 
46. See Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 256–58 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a 
jury’s apportionment of one percent of the fault to the attorneys for aiding and abetting client’s 
breach of fiduciary duty); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) 
(denying recovery because the attorney had no knowledge that he was assisting his client in 
breaching a fiduciary duty). 
47. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 2.7 
(3d ed. Supp. 2007). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) forbids an attorney to counsel a client to 
commit fraudulent activity, but allows an attorney to discuss the legal ramifications of a proposed 
course of conduct.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2004).  Under the derivative 
client model an attorney would be provided less leeway, and borderline advice would be apt to be 
categorized as impermissible counseling.  
51. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 47, § 2.7. Disclosure of this usually privileged 
information by the attorney is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Id.  
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third party-derivative client (because a client is not permitted to use an 
attorney to harm the client’s beneficiary).52 
Professor Hazard rejects the opposite view,espoused by ABA Formal 
Opinion 94-380.53  The Formal Opinion of the ABA Standing Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility states that where an attorney’s 
client is a fiduciary of another, the lawyer has no more duty to the client’s 
beneficiary than to any third party.54  Not only would disclosure of certain 
information by an attorney be non-mandatory (which is counter to Hazard’s 
view), such disclosures to the client’s beneficiary would be prohibited as if 
the disclosures were to any third party.55 
One commentator has struck a third path, arguing that the attorney 
should be able to exercise discretion and should be liable neither to a 
client’s beneficiary for non-disclosure of the client’s malfeasance, nor to the 
client if the lawyer decides to disclose such information.56  Professor Tuttle 
argues that the ABA’s approach neglects to explain why an attorney should 
treat his or her client’s beneficiary as a stranger and ignores the need for a 
more nuanced approach.57  Tuttle’s major qualm with Hazard’s approach is 
that it does not account for conflicting interests, which may arise where the 
client has multiple beneficiaries (or in some cases where there is only a 
single beneficiary).58  Tuttle seems to misconceive Hazard’s approach, 
arguing that it would require the consent of both “joint-clients” and would 
give both the fiduciary-primary client and the beneficiary-derivative client 
the power to discharge the attorney (which, of course, would be 
unworkable).59 
Professor Hazard accounts for such problems however, stating that 
where the client is openly adverse to the “beneficiary,” the joint client 
model is not viable.60  Examples of such clear cases arise: (1) where the 
lawyer is retained to represent the fiduciary in litigation concerning the 
performance of the fiduciary duty; (2) where the lawyer is hired to represent 
the fiduciary in negotiating the terms and conditions of his or her office (the 
duties and compensation of the fiduciary, for example); and (3) where a 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. § 2.7 n.3. 
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 380 (1994). 
55. Id. 
56. Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 889 (1994). 
57. Id. at 905–06. 
58. Id. at 912–14. 
59. Id. at 914–16. 
60. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 33 (1987). 
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lawyer with no prior involvement is hired to negotiate for the termination or 
reformation of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship.61  However, Hazard 
argues that in the “normal legal relationship” between fiduciary and 
beneficiary the fiduciary is fulfilling his or her duties and therefore the joint 
client model poses no such problems.62  However, if the properly 
functioning fiduciary relationship collapses and becomes antagonistic, the 
lawyer would only be able to represent the interests of his or her true (or 
“primary”) client.63 
B. IS MY BROTHER’S BROTHER NOT ALSO MY BROTHER? 
Traditionally, an attorney could only be liable in tort to his or her own 
client.  However, inroads have reconstructed this maxim, and an attorney 
has certain responsibilities to third parties, particularly when the third party 
has a relationship with the attorney’s client.64  In the situation where a 
lawyer’s client is also a fiduciary, the lawyer may have a duty to prevent the 
client from breaching his or her own duties to the non-client.65 
While argument exists as to whether an attorney is required to prevent 
a client’s breach of fiduciary duty,66 a lawyer owes a duty of care to a 
nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer’s client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary 
acting primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient; 
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is 
necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the represen-
tation to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by 
the client to the nonclient, where (i) the breach is a crime or fraud 
or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach; 
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and 
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of 
the lawyer’s obligations to the client.67 
As laid out in subsections (a) and (c), this duty does not attach in all 
circumstances in which the client is a fiduciary—only those in which the 
 
61. Id. at 33–35. 
62. Id. at 36. 
63. Id. at 38–39. 
64. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 47, § 4.6. 
65. Id. 
66. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing whether attorneys have an affirmative duty to 
prevent their clients from breaching their fiduciary duties). 
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(4) (2000). 
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client exercises substantial power over another (as in the case of a guardian 
or trustee) and the client’s beneficiary is not reasonably able to protect its 
own rights.68 
Subsection (b)(i) furthers the crime-fraud exception, requiring the 
attorney to act to prevent or rectify a client’s breach of fiduciary duty that is 
criminal or fraudulent.69  Subsection (b)(ii) requires the same action when 
the lawyer lends assistance to the breach.70  However, according to subsec-
tion (d), if taking such action would substantially impair the performance of 
the attorney’s representation of the client, the lawyer has no obligation to 
act.71  A lawyer is also excused from the obligation if such action would 
cause him or her to breach professional rules.72 
This duty requires attorneys in certain circumstances to clean up their 
own mess when they have assisted a client’s breach of fiduciary duty, or 
prevent a mess from being made when the client’s breach of fiduciary duty 
would be illegal or fraudulent.  Such affirmative duties imply a fundamental 
duty not to aid in a client’s breach of fiduciary duty at the offset.  While 
imposing a duty of disclosure on the attorney could arguably create conflict 
of interest problems and chill clients’ willingness to communicate frankly 
with their attorneys, those same problems do not arise by merely barring the 
attorney from advising or participating in a client’s breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
V. THOUGHTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND A WORD ON PUBLIC POLICY 
Despite courts’ conclusions to the contrary, no solid foundation exists 
to create an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and abetting a 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty.  Whether created explicitly or by “strict 
interpretation” of the elements of the tort, such an exception is 
inappropriate.73 
In protecting attorneys from lawsuits alleging aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty through the imposition of a heightened pleading 
standard, requiring the plaintiff to lay out his or her claim in more rigorous 
 
68. Id. § 51(4)(a), (c). 
69. Id. § 51(4)(b)(i). 
70. Id. § 51(4)(b)(ii). 
71. Id. § 51(4)(d). 
72. Id. § 51 cmt. h. 
73. One positive note is that no court has created an unqualified exception from liability for 
attorneys.  The exception is limited by the attorney’s scope of representation.  Attorneys acting 
outside of the attorney-client relationship may claim no protection, as they are most likely acting 
for their own benefit (either directly or indirectly, as through the generation of more fees). 
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detail in the complaint is especially inappropriate.74  Pleading with such 
particularity is usually reserved for situations in which even the allegation 
of the tortious activity could damage a potentially innocent defendant (for 
example, fraud or mistake).75  Allegations of aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty do not rise to the same level of damage in accusation.  Any 
charge of tortious activity inevitably causes some harm to the defendant, 
but this particular cause of action does no more harm to a professional 
reputation than other torts, such as malpractice, which do not command 
heightened levels of specificity at the pleading stage. 
Applying aiding and abetting liability to breaches of fiduciary duties 
creates clear liability for those who assist in such breaches.76  Unless a 
wealth of close cases exist in which an attorney’s loyalties would be 
divided between zealously representing a client and protecting him- or 
herself from a lawsuit, no beneficial policy exists that justifies creating an 
exception for attorneys who assist clients in breaching a fiduciary duty.  
Attorneys who aid or advise clients in perpetrating frauds or engaging in 
illegal activity may be held liable for their actions, and indeed the attorney-
client privilege is not available for communications regarding the fraud or 
crime.77  The reasoning behind such a rule is that society rightfully wishes 
to discourage attorneys from making such suggestions to clients.78  The 
same rationale applies to advising clients to breach fiduciary duties.  Since 
 
74. See Witman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 (Minn. 1999) 
(requiring plaintiffs to plead facts with particularity when attempting to impose aiding and 
abetting liability on professionals). 
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”). 
76. The common law of agency is helpful by analogy in this area (especially given that 
agents are fiduciaries of their principals).  The Restatement of Agency states that “[a] person who, 
without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his 
principal is subject to liability to the principal.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 
(1958).  Comment (d) to that section makes clear that liability may be enforced through a tort 
action against the party that assisted in the violation of the duty.  Id. § 312 cmt. d.  Comment (a) 
states that privileges to aid an agent in breaching a duty to his principal are “rare,” and uses the 
parent-child privilege as the only example:  A parent may assist a child in breaching a duty to the 
child’s principal.  Id. § 312 cmt. a.  
 An attorney’s privilege to aid his or her client in breaching a fiduciary duty is based in 
protecting societal good, by fostering the attorney-client relationship and strengthening the legal 
system.  Such “benefit of society” privileges should be extended cautiously, for these privileges 
have no specific beneficiaries.  However, those who are harmed by the privilege—the parties to 
whom the breached fiduciary duty was owed—are easily identifiable. 
77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. f (2000) 
(stating that lawyers are subject to the same liability as non-lawyers, subject to certain excep-
tions); 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 95 (6th ed. 2006) (“[I]t 
would be a perversion of justice to extend [the attorney-client privilege] to the client who seeks 
advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme.”). 
78.  MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 77, § 95. 
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such advice is to be discouraged, attorneys who proffer it should be held 
liable to the extent they cause harm. 
